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JIM CROW, INDIAN STYLE: THE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF NATIVE AMERICANS
Jeanette Wolfley*
Introduction
In 1965 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act, which spurred
the black voting rights movement in the South and set the stage
for major changes in the national political system. The campaign
for equal voting rights spread to Hispanic communities of the
rural southwest and urban barrios.' Indians have taken the path
developed by blacks and Hispanics to seek enforcement of the
fifteenth amendment by challenging election schemes and systems devised by towns bordering reservations, counties,
and
school districts throughout the West and Southwest. 2
Like black and Hispanic voters, Indians have faced intense,
deep-seated resistance and racism from the majority community
while attempting to gain and exercise the franchise. The Indians'
struggle to participate in the democratic process has a unique
and complex history which mirrors their long, cyclic relationship
with the federal government. Indeed, the history of Indian
disenfranchisement reflects a panoply of shifting majority attitudes, policies, and laws toward Indians.
This article examines the ongoing struggle of Indians to gain
the right to vote and, thus, have a meaningful opportunity to
fully participate in the political process. It will discuss historical
and modern disenfranchisement and the continued progress toward the goal of political equality envisioned by the fifteenth
amendment.
o

1990 Jeanette Wolfley

* General Counsel, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes; Former Director of the Voting

Rights Project and Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund. J.D., 1982, University
of New Mexico; B.A., 1979, University of Minnesota. I wish to thank Jacqueline
Williams and Vicki Powers for their time and comments on previous drafts of this
article.
1. See Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1988); Campos v.
City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988).
2. See, e.g., Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont.
1986) (lawsuit by Crow and Northern Cheyenne against at-large elections in Montana);
Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. School Dist., 804 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1985) (challenge by
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux to at-large school district in South Dakota); Sanchez v. King,
550 F. Supp. 13 (D.N.M. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 801 (1983) (Navajo and Pueblo voters'
action against reapportionment plan of New Mexico).
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Imposition of Naturalization and Citizenship
Inthe past 200 years, federal Indian policy has been a product
of tension between two conflicting responses to the "Indian
problem"-separation and assimilation. One federal policy coerced Indians to adopt and integrate into the mainstream white
majority, while another obstructed their participation in the
growing American society. The struggle over Indian voting rights
illustrates these two policies.
Naturalization and citizenship laws were major mechanisms
to facilitate federal efforts to assimilate Indians, obtain Indian
lands, and terminate tribal governments. From 1854 to 1924,
naturalization and citizenship were the primary devices used to
induce assimilation. As this article will show, these federal efforts were
not readily accepted by the majority society and
3
Indians.
The common objectives of the majoritys' views stemmed from
the principles articulated by Chief Justice-Marshall in his three
landmnark opinions, known as the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v.
M'Irtosh,4 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,5 and Worcester v. Georgia.6 These cases treated Indian tribes as distinct, independent
3. See, e.g., In re Heft, 197 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1905), overruled sub nom. United
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
4. 21 U.S. (8Wheat.) 543 (1823). In this decision, the Court held as invalid tribal
conveyance of land to private individuals. The Court reasoned that Indians retained a
right of occupancy extinguishable by discovering European sovereigns. The result was
a recognition of a legal right of Indians in their lands valid against all parties save the
federal government.
5. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 9 (1831). Cherokee Nation expanded the recognition of Indian
sovereignty set forth in Johnson v. M'Intosh. Georgia attempted to impose its laws on
the Cherokees in violation of treaty provisions. To stop such intrusions, the Cherokee
filed suait in the Supreme Court under article III, section 2 of the United States
Constitution-a section which gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases and
controversies involving states and foreign nations. Id. at 7-14. The key issue before the
Court was whether the Cherokees constituted a "foreign nation" in the Constitutional
sense. Chief Justice Marshall determined that they did not. However, Marshall determined that the tribe was a state in the international sense; it was "a distinct political
society separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."
Id. at 16. Marshall noted that the tribe was "ina state of pupilage," and "their
relations with the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id. at 17.
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 528 (1832). The following term, Justice Marshall addressed
the unresolved issue of state jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Georgia attempted to prevent
non-Indians from living on Cherokee lands without permission of the State's Governor.
In a strongly-worded opinion, Marshall struck down the application of Georgia law to
Cherokee lands, stating: "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force." Id. at 561. Marshall's opinion is the foundation of law excluding
a states' law from Indian Country.
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political communities. As seen below, this treatment has since
raised questions of dual citizenship, wardship, and competency.
Naturalization
In Marshall's understanding, Indian tribes possessed a sovereignty as complete as that of any European nation. After forming political alliances through treaties with the United States,
tribes surrendered their sovereignty but remained sovereigns in
the sense the term has been used since the early nineteenth
century.7 Prior to the General Allotment Act of 1887,8 most
Indians were considered members of separate political communities and not part of the state politic or the United States.9 The
term "sovereign" is used to describe the status of tribal governments, and it is acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court as a fundamental of modem federal law.' 0
Despite the Marshall Trilogy, the settlers' demand for Indian
lands increased rapidly and forced politicians to develop a policy
of removal. West of the Mississippi River lay vast amounts of
presumably unoccupied lands; by pushing Indians beyond the
river settlers would possess the land.
The popularity of removal was so strong that the federal
government embarked on a campaign of negotiating removal
treaties even before President Andrew Jackson signed the Indian
Removal Act of 1830.11 Removal was more than an assault on
7. Tribal sovereignty as recognized in Worcester is best described by Felix Cohen:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers
is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian
tribe possess, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state,
(2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to legislative power of the United

States, and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of
the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but

does not, by itself, affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its
power of local self-government, (3) these powers are subject to qualification
by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus
expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the

Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.
F. COEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INwAxN LAW 123 (1942 ed.
8. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
9. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); The Kansas Indians
72 U.S. (5 wall.) 737 (1866); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

10. In modern times, the Supreme Court has held that tribal governments are
"unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory." See, e.g., United States v. wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
11. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (current version of §§ 7-8 at 25 U.S.C. § 174 (1988)). The
Act authorized President Jackson to exchange territory west of the Mississippi River

for the lands of eastern tribes. For further discussion, see F. COHEN,
FEDERAL INDLAN LAW 78-92 (1982 ed.).

HANDBOOK OF
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Indians; many believed that the removal policy was the only
means of saving Indians from extermination. Removal eventually
served to promote assimilation, albeit assimilation by separation.
]:n conjunction with removal, the federal government created
the reservation, a strategy which sought to change Indian tribes
politically, socially, and economically.'2 Instead of their traditional tribal leadership, most tribal members found themselves
subject to the authority of white agents from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). However, many reformers saw the reservations as cultural failures; others as economic failures or obstacles to progress. For example, railroads were accelerating their
demand for Indian lands and cattle ranchers made similar demands.
With the reservation policy clearly not working, reformers
abandoned it and launched a triple assault on Indian sovereignty:
the creation of a federal school system for Native Americans,"
the extension of federal laws to Indians,'14 and the allotment of
tribal lands.'.
fly splintering the reservations and distributing the land in
allotments to individual Indians, the reformers hoped to destroy
tribal economic power and assimilate Indians to European-American commercial values. It was intended that when tribal economic power was eliminated, tribal political power would also
wane; the reformers would then grant United States citizenship
to allotted Indians. Thus, federal supervision of Indians would
become unnecessary. The reformers believed economic self-sufficiency, legal subjugation, and assimilation was the solution to
the "Indian problem."
Most reformers agreed that assimilation was the ultimate solution, and a structured education, an allotment policy, and
United States citizenship were the most effective ways to bring
it about. Some reformers wanted assimilation immediately: railroads, oil companies, homesteaders and cattle ranchers demanded immediate placement of Indian children in schools,
award of citizenship, and allotment of tribal land. Other re12. See ch. 85, 3 Stat. 516 (1819) (current version of § I at 25 U.S.C. § 271
(1988)).
13. Education for Indians was provided by mission schools in the early days.

Beginning in the late 1870s, off-reservation boarding schools were established. In the
eyes of reformists, off-reservation boarding schools were the ideal method of assimilation
because Indian youth were removed from their families. See SPECiAL SuBcomm. ON
INDIAN EDUCATION, A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 501,

91st Cong., Ist Sess. 140-52 (1969).
14. See F. PRUCHA, AmEmucAN INDIAN Poucy IN CRisis 328-41 (1976).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17, 44-50, & 57-60.
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formers insisted on a more gradual approach that emphasized
citizenship and allotment only when an Indian was culturally
prepared for both. Between 1880 and 1934, policy toward Indians vacillated between these extremes.
Congressional efforts to naturalize entire tribes generally fell
short of their intended goal. For example, from 1839 to 1850,
the Stockbridge-Munsee, Brotherton, and Wyandot Indians were
plagued with incessant congressional efforts to make them citizens. 16 In other congressional attempts, citizenship was made
dependent upon the acceptance of an allotment of land; the
alternative to accepting an allotment was removal from native
17
lands.
Indians who were not granted citizenship by congressional
action were barred from the naturalization process open to
European immigrants; Indians were regarded as domestic subjects or nationals.' This concept of Indian status was reiterated
by United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing in 1856:19
The fact, therefore, that Indians are born in the country does not make them citizens of the United States.
The simple truth is plain, that Indians are subjects of
the United States, and therefore are not, in mere right
of home-birth, citizens of the United States.
But they cannot become citizens by naturalization under existing general acts of Congress. Those acts apply
to foreigners, subjects of another allegiance. The Indians are not foreigners, and they are in our allegiance,
without being citizens of the United States. Moreover,
those acts only apply to "white" men.
16. See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 83, 5 Stat. 349, 351 (Brotherton); Act of Mar.
3, 1843, ch. 101, § 7, 5 Stat. 645, 647 (Stockbridge); Act of August 6, 1846, ch. 85, 9
Stat. 55 (Stockbridge); Treaty with the Senecas [and Others], Feb. 23, 1867, art. 13, 15
Stat. 513, 516 (tribal signatories included the Senecas, Shawnees, Quapaws, and Wyan-

dots). Article 13 of the treaty with the Senecas prohibited tribal membership to Wyandots
who had consented to United States citizenship under a prior treaty unless they were
found "unfit for the responsibilities of citizenship." Id.
17. See Treaty with the Pottawatomie Indians, Feb. 27, 1867, United StatesPottawatomies, art. 6, 15 Stat. 531, 531-33; Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29,
1868, United States-Sioux, art. 6, 15 Stat. 635, 637; Treaty with the Choctaws, Sept.
27, 1830, United States-Choctaws, arts. 14, 16, 7 Stat. 333, 335-36.
18. See In re Camille, 6 Fed. 256 (C. Or. 1880); In re Burton, 1 Alaska 111 (D.
Alaska 1900). Camille is a prime example of the deep-seated racism held by many
whites, and certainly by the judiciary, against nonwhite persons in the late 1800s.
19. 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 746 (1856).
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Indians, of course, can be made citizens of the United
States only by some competent act of the General
20
Government, either a treaty or an act of Congress.
In the early citizenship case of Scott v. Sanford1 (the Dred
Scott Case), the Supreme Court held that a black person could
not become a citizen under the Constitution.?2 The Supreme
Court stated, in dictum, that Indians were not citizens, in the
constitutional sense, but that Congress had the power to naturalize Indians.2? Thus, the Dred Scott Case effectively concluded
that Indians who were unable to prove they were born under
United States jurisdiction2 were precluded from registering to
vote.
A.though Congress did eventually naturalize all Indians, before the Reconstruction Era zs the general naturalization laws
were restricted to European immigrants and did not include
native-born Indians.26 In 1868, section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment defined citizenship as "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States .... "27
20. Id. at 749-50.
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
22. Id. at 403-04. This notorious decision was legislatively overridden by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
23. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403-04.
24. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
25. After the Civil War, the First Reconstruction Act of 1867 mandated that the
Confederate States, in order to reenter the Union, had to adopt new constitutions
guaranteeing male suffrage without regard to race. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14
Stat. 428. Subsequently, Congress adopted the fifteenth amendment in 1870, which
guarantees the right to vote irrespective of "race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
26. See Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. Indians born in Canada, Mexico,
or other foreign countries did not become eligible for citizenship until the adoption of
the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140, superseded by Act of
June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 301, 66 Stat. 163, 235 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952)),
because the Citizenship Act of 1924 referred only to "Indians born within the territorial
limits of the United States." Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253. See
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 95 n.5 (1934).
27. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
clue process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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Following passage of the amendment, some erroneously thought
Indians automatically qualified for United States citizenship because of the phrase "all persons," and because Indians were
not explicitly excluded. This dispute prompted the Senate to
instruct the Senate Judiciary Committee to inquire into the status
of Indians under the amendment.2
In December, 1870, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported
that Indians who maintained their tribal relations were not
citizens under the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, they could
not be said to have been born under the complete jurisdiction
of the United States. 29 The Committee had the view that citizenship was incompatible with continued participation in tribal
government or tribal property. That is, citizenship required affirmative consent to jurisdiction of the United States. The report
stated:
To maintain that the United States intended, by a
change of its fundamental law, which was not ratified
by these tribes, and to which they were neither requested nor permitted to assent, to annual treaties
then existing between the United States as one party,
and the Indian tribes as the other -parties respectively,
would be to charge upon the United States repudiation
of national obligations, repudiation doubly infamous
from the fact that the parties whose claims were thus
annulled are too weak to enforce their just rights, and
were enjoying the voluntarily assumed guardianship
30
and protection of this Government.
One year later, an Oregon district court agreed with the Judiciary
Committee and held that Indians born in tribal allegiance were
not persons born in the United States and thus subject to its
jurisdiction. 31 The court stated:
To be a citizen of the United States by reason of his
birth, a person must not only be born within its
territorial limits, but he must also be born subject to
its jurisdiction-that is, in its power and obedience.... But the Indian tribes within the limits of
the United States have always been held to be distinct
28. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2479 (1870) (text of the resolution of

inquiry).
29. SEN. REP. No. 268, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-11 (1870).
30. Id. at 11.
31. McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161 (D. Or. 1871) (No. 8840).
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and independent political communities, retaining the
right of self-government, though subject
to the pro2
tecting power of the United States.
This position was sustained by a subsequent United States Supreme Court naturalization case, Elk v. Wilkins."
Elk represents a torturous interpretation of state statutes and
constitutional amendments in order to prevent Indians from
voting. John Elk left his tribe and resided in Omaha, Nebraska.
He attempted to exercise his right to vote in Nebraska. The
Court, in upholding the denial of his right to vote, reasoned
that he was not an American citizen because his intent to become
a citizen required a positive and specific response from the
United States before it could affect his status as a citizen. 4
The Court further concluded that the fifteenth amendment
did not apply to Elk, nor was he a United States citizen because
he did not owe allegiance to the United States.3" A final reason
for denying the right to Elk was that the United States had
entered into treaties and enacted statutes (before and after the
fourteenth amendment) naturalizing particular tribes and portiors of tribes. 36 Therefore, the federal government had other
legislative means of naturalizing Indians.
The majority opinion chose to disregard that Elk had severed
relations with his tribe. 37 The Court construed section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment as requiring a person deemed a citizen
by birth to be subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the United
States at the time of birth. 3 Since Elk was born to a tribal
member who lived on tribal land, he was not a citizen by birth.
112. Id. at 165-66.
33. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
34. Elk, 112 U.S. at 109.

35. Id. at 99. The Court also relied on the fourteenth amendment phraseology,
"Indians not taxed," to deny the franchise to Elk. Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment provides: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according

to their respective numbers, counting the whole numbers of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). A
similar provision is found elsewhere in the Constitution. Id. art. I, § 2, cl.3. In 1926,
when § I was codified, the phrase "Indians not taxed" was deleted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1
(1926).
36. Elk, 112 U.S. at 108-09.
37. Elk lived outside Indian Country within Nebraska and was subject to state and
federd taxation.
38. Id. See also United States v. Osborn, 2 F. 58 (D. Or. 1880). For a study of
the effects of tribal membership on citizenship, see Katzenmeyer v. United States, 225
F. 501, 523 (7th Cir. 1915).
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The Elk dissenting opinion by Judge Harlan is better reasoned.39 The dissent points out that the legislative history of the
fourteenth amendment demonstrates the drafters understood those
Indians, such as Elk, who were considered citizens pursuant to
4
0 The dissent further argued that prior to the foursection 1.
teenth amendment Congress had granted citizenship to many
Indians who abandoned their tribal ties. 41 The dissent also noted
that the 1870 Senate Judiciary Committee report supported Indian citizenship under the fourteenth amendment, and that
the report closes with this significant language: "It is
pertinent to say, in concluding this report, that treaty
relations can properly exist with Indian tribes or Nations
only, and that when the members of any Indian tribe
are scattered, they are merged in the mass of our
people and become equally subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.' 42
To the advocates of immediate citizenship, the Elk decision was
an outrage. 43 An English-speaking farmer and family man, Elk
was acculturated to European-American society and was certainly deserving of citizenship. Something had to be done, and
the advocates for gradual citizenship were pressured into merging
the question of Indian citizenship with their drive for the allotment of tribal lands.
Following Elk, the legal status of Indians represented a state
unknown to civil law: Indians were neither citizens nor aliens;
they were not white under the naturalization laws, or slaves, or
persons in a previous condition of servitude. 44 Barring special
acts, treaties, or a constitutional amendment, many Indians
appeared to exist in a legal vacuum.
Indian Citizenship
Although John Elk was never naturalized, thousands of Indians were naturalized from the mid-1850s through the early
39.
40.
41.
42.

Elk, 112 U.S. at 112-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 117-18. Significantly, the majority ignored the legislative history.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 119.

43. In an Asian-American naturalization case, United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Supreme Court again found that Indians were not citizens.
The Court excepted from its theory of citizenship by birth "members of Indian tribes
of which owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes and were not part of the
people of the United States ... ." Id. at 662 (dictum).

44. The status of Indians was overshadowed at the end of the Civil War by the
discussion and efforts for blacks to gain freedom, citizenship, and economic conditions
equal to whites.
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19D0s. By accepting allotments and leaving the reservation or
tribal society, Indians were rewarded with citizenship. By 1924,
nearly two-thirds of all Indians were granted citizenship by
treaties or special and general statutes. 45
Treaties and Special Acts
The southeastern tribes were the first to receive citizenship
through their treaties with the United States. 46 In some treaties,
citizenship was dependent on acceptance of an allotment of land
in severalty. 47 Indeed, in Elk, the Court identified twelve treaties,
four statutes, four judicial opinions, and eight attorney general
opinions that required "proof of fitness for civilization" before
an Indian could obtain citizenship and the right to vote. 48
Many tribes were naturalized by special statute. In the cases
of the Stockbridge and Brotherton Tribes of Wisconsin, the
tribes were dissolved and land distributed to the members. Once
allotment was complete, the Indians became citizens. 49 Citizenship was also premised on the requirements that Indians adopt
the habits of "civilized life": learn to read and speak English. 0
Another general act granted citizenship to Indian women who
married white men.51
'In 1890, as an enticement to members of the Five Civilized
Tribes5 2 to abandon their tribal relations, Congress passed the
Indian Territory Naturalization Act. 53 The Act provided
45. See D. McCooL, INDIA VoTINO 106 (1985).
46. Treaty with the Cherokees, July 8, 1817, United States-Cherokees, art. 8, 7
Stal:. 156, 159; Treaty with the Cherokees, Feb. 27, 1819, United States-Cherokees, art.
2, 7 Stat. 195, 196; Treaty with the Choctaws, Sept. 27, 1830, United States-Choctaws,
art. 14, 7 Stat. 333, 335. See F. ComN, supra note 8, at 153 nn. 6-10, for treaties
conferring citizenship on tribes and individual Indians.
47. See Treaty with the Kickapoos, June 28, 1862, art. 3, 13 Stat. 623, 624; Treaty
with the Senecas [and Others], Feb. 23, 1867, art. 13, 15 Stat. 513, 516 (treaty between
the United States and the Senecas, Shawnees, Quapaws, Wyandots and others).
48. Elk, 112 U.S. at 100.
49. See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 83, 5 Stat. 349, 351 (Brotherton); Act of Mar.
3, 1843, ch. 101, § 7, 5 Stat. 645, 647 (Stockbridge).
50. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, § 4, 13 Stat. 541, 562. See Oakes v. United States, 172
F. 305 (8th Cir. 1909).
51. Act of Aug. 9, 1888, ch. 818, 25 Stat. 392.
52. The Seminole, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Creek Nations.
53. Act of May 2, 1890, § 43, 26 Stat. 81, 99-100. The Five Civilized Tribes
opposed the grant of federal citizenship to their people because they feared it would
terminate their tribal government. See S. Misc. Doc. No. 7, 45th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec.
1877) (vol. 1). Significantly, the Five Civilized Tribes were excluded from the General
Allotment Act of 1887, §§ 6, 8, 24 Stat. 388, 390-91.
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[t]hat any member of any Indian tribe or nation residing in the Indian Territory may apply to the United
States court therein to become a qitizen of the United
States, and such court shall have jurisdiction thereof
and shall hear and determine such application as provided ... [t]hat the Indians who become citizens of
the United States under provisions of this Act do not
forfeit or lose any rights or privileges they enjoy or
are entitled to as members of the tribe or nation to
which they belong.The Act is similar to statutes enacted for specific tribes. 5 Also,
more than any other federal legislation, it implies that Indians
hold dual citizenship. However, it also reaffirms the potential
incompatibility between tribal membership and United States
citizenship.
The Allotment Period
In 1887, Congress passed the most disastrous Indian legislation
in United States history: the General Allotment Act of 1887
(GAA).5 6 The GAA had dual goals of opening Indian lands for
white 8settlement 7 and assimilating Indians into mainstream society.
Assimilation was accomplished by imposing citizenship upon
two classes of Indians: (1) those to whom allotments were made
by the GAA, or any law or treaty, and (2) those who voluntarily
lived apart from their tribes and "adopted the habits of civilized
life." 59 Under the first instance, citizenship was automatic at the
54. Act of May 2, 1890, § 43, 26 Stat. 81, 99-100.
55. See, e.g., Act of July 15, 1870, § 10, 16 Stat. 335, 361-63. Under this act, a
Minnesota Winnebago could apply to the federal district court for citizenship. See also
Act of Mar. 3, 1873, § 3, 17 Stat. 631, 632.
56. Ch. 199, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348 (1982))
[hereinafter GAA]. This legislation is also known as Dawes Severalty Act or the Dawes
Act.
57. "[The most powerful force motivating the allotment policy was the pressure

of land-hungry western settlers." History of the Allotment Policy: Hearings on H.R.
7902 Before the House Comm. on IndianAffairs, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) (statement
of D. Otis), quoted in D. GErcnms, D. RosmNrmT & C. WnxxnsoN, FmERAL INi
LAW 71 (1979)).
58. Representative Skinner, House sponsor of the GAA, said that "tribal relations
must be broken up" and the "example of the white people" would provide a model
for the Indians. 18 CoNo. REc. 190-91 (1886).
59. GAA, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390. Section 6 provided:
Every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States, to

whom allotments shall have been made under the provisions of this act,
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end of the twenty-five year period in which the allotment was
held in trust by the Secretary of Interior. However, some tribes
had their period of trust status extended by legislation or executive order, so it became difficult to determine who was a
United States citizen and who was not. This allotment requirement actually meant that citizenship, long recognized as a personal right of an individual, was really a function of the status
of the real estate the Indian might possess.
Citizenship increased rapidly after the passage of the GAA.
By 1890, citizenship had been extended to 5,307 Indian allottees,
and by 1900, to 53,168. 60 In 1901, Congress awarded citizenship
to another 101,506 Indians in Indian Territory, and by 1905
more than half of all Indians had become citizens. 61 President
GAA as "a mighty
Theodore Roosevelt aptly described the ' '62
pulverizing engine to break up the mass.
During this allotment period (1887-1901), among many Indians
the recognition of United States citizenship became a ceremonial
event: It symbolized the Indian casting away traditions and
customs and assuming the beliefs and values of the majority
society. One citizenship ceremony involved a man "shooting his
last arrow" and taking hold of the handles of a plow to demonstrate his intent to become an American citizen. 63 Another
purse
ritual involved an Indian woman accepting a workbag and
64
to hold money earned from labor and "wisely kept."
Interest in further altering the trust status of Indian land
continued. In 1906, Congress amended the GAA by enacting
the Burke Act. 65 Under the Burke Act, the twenty-five year trust
period was eliminated and an Indian became a citizen upon the
issuance of a fee patent. Conveyance of the fee patent was made
after the Commission of Indian Affairs determined an allottee

or under any law or treaty, ... is hereby declared to be a citizen of the
United States and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of
such citizen.
GAA, § 6.
60. J. OLsoN & R. WILsoN, NATrVE AmmiucANs ni THE Twrm'NTH CENTURY 73

(1984) phereinafter OLSON & WsoN].
61. Id.
62. 35 CoNe. REc. 90 (1901) (message by President Theodore Roosevelt).
63. V. DELORIA, JR., OF UTmosT GOOD FArrH 142-43 (1971).
(4. Id. at 143.
65. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
The Act was named after its sponsor, Congressman Charles Burke of South Dakota.
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was "competent and capable of managing his or her affairs.... ."66 Again, the granting of citizenship was made dependent on severance of tribal ties. 67
The Post-Allotment Period
Prior to World War I, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of Interior, Franklin K. Lane, identified the political potential of the
Indian voter, particularly in the Dakotas, Arizona, New Mexico,
Montana, Oklahoma, and other states with relatively large numbers of Indians. 68 Secretary Lane urged the Democratic Party to
seek to register Indian voters for the 1916 national election.
Most whites in the western states were, however, quite hostile
to the idea of Indians as voters, even though Indians would
have been participating only in federal elections. 69 In addition,
both the Harding and Coolidge Administrations were cognizant
of the political potential of the Indian voter and moved toward
increasing Indian participation in the political decision-making
70
process by seeking Indian involvement in the Republican Party.
Meanwhile, during World War I Congress had again attempted to resolve the issue of Indian citizenship. After the
United States entered the war, thousands of Indians volunteered
for the armed forces and for support work in the states. Ironically, these volunteers included individuals whose tribes had
been fighting the United States Army as recently as thirty-five
years earlier.7 ' As a result of the Indian response, it became
apparent to the federal government that it would finally have
to respond to the ambiguity of the legal status of Indians.7 2 In
66. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).

67. See United States v. Debell, 227 F. 760 (D.S.D. 1915).
68. See F. SVENSSoN, THE ETmncs iN AmmcAN Poimcs: AimaxcAN INDANs 2425 (1973).
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Iroquois League, in an effort to reassert its autonomy and independence
as a nation, formally declared war on Germany in 1917, separately from the United
States and claimed status as one of the Allied Nations. Additionally, during the
citizenship debates of the early 1920s, the Iroquois protected any attempts to grant them
citizenship and declared that they would not accept citizenship if Congress granted it in
the future.
72. In 1918, it was reported that the Indian population was 336,000. Though less
than 10% were military age, more than 7,000 served in the armed forces. Also at that
time only 30% of all Indians could read and write English and less than half were
citizens. Peterson, Native American PoliticalParticipation,ANNAis, May 1957, at 116,
123.
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1919, Congress declared that all Indians who had served in the
anmed forces and received honorable discharges would be granted
American citizenship upon application .3
Yet again, the citizenship question was caught up in a conflict
of responses among the majority society. Some favored citizenship on moral grounds, while others viewed citizenship as the
final step to integrating Indians into the main society. Congressmen such as Edgard Howard of Nebraska and Gale Stalker of
New York, were interested in ending the trust status of Indian
lands and advocated blanket immediate citizenship.74 Stalker and
Howard introduced citizenship bills in 192375 which encountered
immediate hostility from factions who favored gradual assimilation and preservation of Indian lands and Indians who wanted
to retain their tribal status.7 6
The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924
Out of these conflicting points of view came compromise
legislation. In 1924, Congressman Homer P. Snyder of New
York introduced House Resolution 6355, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant citizenship to all Indians who
requested it, if they were "individually prepared" for the responsibilities." In addition, the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs proposed a blanket immediate citizenship law, 78 which
was opposed by full-blood Indians and whites who were skeptical
about rapid assimilation. Finally, out of Congress emerged the
Indian Citizenship Act, 79 which states
[t]hat all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial
limits of the United States be, and they are hereby,
declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided
that the granting of such citizenship shall not in any
manner impair or otherwise affect the right of an
Indian to tribal or other property.80
73. See Act of Nov. 6, 1919, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350.
74. OisoN & WsoN, supra note 60, at 84.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 85.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253. The Act's drafter was Charles B.
Curtis, a Kaw Indian from Oklahoma, who served in the United States House of
Representatives (1893-1906), and the United States Senate (1907-13; 1913-1929). Curtis
serve.-d as U.S. vice president under Herbert Hoover from 1929-1933.
80. Id. The substance of this Act was incorporated into the Nationality Act of
Oct. 14, 1949, ch. 876, § 201, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 601
(1940)). It was superseded in 1952 by the Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 301, 66 Stat.
163, 235 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952)).
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The Indian Citizenship Act effectively ended the relationship
between citizenship and tribal affiliation or federal protection.8 '
The question of citizenship is a complex one for Indians.
Many Indians either had no interest in it or else actively sought
to reject it. Some have challenged citizenship by refusing to vote
in federal and state elections or denying their United States
citizenship and strongly asserting tribal sovereignty. Also, tribes
2
have issued tribal passports in place of United States passports
The Justification by States in Denying Indians the Franchise
An important premise flowing from the United States Constitution is that no one is granted the right to vote. Rather, the
fifteenth amendment states that no citizen's right to vote shall
be "denied or abridged by the United States or any state on
' A
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 83
second implication of the Constitution is that franchise is almost
entirely a state matter; that is, states shall prescribe "the times,
places and manner" of holding elections8 Thus, states had the
control over whether Indians could exercise their franchise.
Although Indians were granted United States citizenship in
1924, state doubts were not appeased. Most states continued to
refuse to recognize Indians as citizens of the state in which they
resided. Other states' officials devised laws to limit Indians'
access to the ballot box. The unwillingness of states to allow
Indians to vote was no surprise given the history of conflict and
antagonism between Indian tribes and states. The often-quoted
language of the Supreme Court in 1886 summed up the tribalstate political relationship: "They [tribes] owe no allegiance to
the States and receive from them no protection. Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the United States where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies." 8 5
81. Opponents of Indian rights continue to question the dual status of Indians. See
infra notes 83-163 and accompanying text. The courts, however, have held the Act
neither affected the trust relationship nor conditioned it upon the severance of tribal
ties. See United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285
U.S. (1932); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); Bowling v. United States, 233
U.S. 528 (1914); Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317 (1911).
82. See F. SVENssoN, supra note 68, at 26. Tribal sovereignty and how some Indians
regard the state-tribal relationship inhibits full participation in state politics. Some
Indians contend that their voting in state elections would be an acknowledgement of
state jurisdiction over Indian reservations. See U.S. CoMM'N ON CVnr. RilIrs, NATIVE
Am!mucAN PARTICIPATION IN Soumu DAKOTA'S PoIrmcAL SYsTEm 19-21 (1981).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
85. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
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This hostility is evident still today. As noted in a recent New
Mexico Indian voting rights case: "We note an abiding sentiment
among the Indians of New Mexico that the state is an enemy
of the tribes. In states with a significant number of Indians,
there are disputes between tribal and state governments as to
their respective spheres of authority. New Mexico is no excep0

"o.86

States have five basic arguments in justifying the denial of
voting rights to Indians: (1) failure to sever tribal ties makes
Indians ineligible; (2) "Indians not taxed"; (3) Indians are under
guardianship; (4) reservation Indians are not residents; and (5)
precludes participation in state and local govtribal sovereignty
7
ernments.1
Failure To Sever Tribal Ties
Abandonment of traditional Indian culture was once a prerequisite for participation in some state politics. The Minnesota
Constitution once granted citizenship only to those Indians who
had "adopted
the language, customs and habits of civilization. 8s8 South Dakota also prohibited Indians from voting or
holding office "while maintaining tribal relations." 9 The constitutions of Idaho and North Dakota contained similar language. 9°
In 1920, the votes of Indians in North Dakota were challenged
by opponents. In Swift v. Leach, 9' the North Dakata Supreme
Court considered whether 273 Indians of the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe were eligible to vote under article 5, section 121 of
the North Dakota Constitution.9 2 Section 121 provided that:
86. Sanchez v. King, No. 82-0067-M, 2-0084-C, 82-0180-C, 82-0219-JB, 82-0246-

JB, slip op. at 27 (D.N.M. Aug. 8, 1984) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law).
87. These justifications have been categorized as "constitutional ambiguity, political

and economic factors, and cultural and racial discrimination." D. McCoot, INDIAN
VOTING 106 (1985). See also M. PRIcE, LAW AND THE AmiERicAN INDIAN 229-37 (1973).

Price analyzed five arguments: severance of tribal relations, lack of state power over
Indiea conduct, fear of political control shifting of Indian majorities, guardianship, and
residency.
38. MINi. CONST. art. VII, § 1, cI. 4 (1857, repealed 1960).

:39. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 92 (1929). This law requiring severance of tribal
ties remained on the books until 1951.
90. IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1890, repealed 1950); N.D. CoNsT. art. V, § 121
(1889, repealed 1922).

91. 45 N.D. 437, 178 N.W. 437 (1920). Swift has also been rejected in favor of
the proposition that federal guardianship of Indians disqualifies Indians as electors. See
Porter v. Hall, 34 Ariz. 308, 271 P. 411, 412 (1928).
92. Swift, 178 N.W. at 438.
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Every male person of the age of twenty-one years or
upwards, belonging to either of the following classes,
who shall have resided in the state one year and in
the county six months, and in the precinct ninety days
next preceding election, shall be a qualified elector at
such election:
..

Civilized persons of Indian descent who

shall have severed their tribal relations two
years next preceding such election. 93
In determining whether the Indians were eligible to vote, the
court reviewed testimony of numerous witnesses (superintendents
of the local Indian agency, a county judge, and other county
officials) who testified that the "trust patent" Indians had
severed tribal tiesY4 One superintendent of the Fort Yates Agency
testified on behalf of the Indian voters by stating:
[T]he Indians have ceased to live in bands under a
chief; ... their educational qualifications compare fa-

vorably with white people; they marry the same as
white people; have fixed abodes, they live as white
people; they are competent to handle their own affairs,
and their knowledge of English is as good -as the
average white man; they have severed their tribal relations and adopted the mode of civilized life and are
well qualified to become citizens of this state. 5
In sum, the testimony emphasized that the Sioux voters were
loyal to the majority government, rather than their tribe.
The county argued that (1) the Indians were not civilized, (2)
they could not sever their tribal ties without federal consent,
and (3) they were under guardianship and, thus, ineligible to
vote. 96 In rejecting these arguments, the court found that the
Indians were electors under section 21 of the state constitution
because they had "adopted and observed the habits and mode
of life of civilized persons." 97
93. N.D. CONST. art. V, § 121 (1889, amended 1898 & 1920, repealed 1922).
94. Swift, 178 N.W. at 438-39. The Indians were referred to as "trust patent"

Indians because they received allotments of land under the Burke Act but had not yet
received fee titles.
95. Id., 178 N.W. at 439.
96. Id., 178 N.W. at 440-41.
97. Id., 178 N.W. at 443. A similar inquiry regarding abandonment of tribal
relation occurred in Osborn, in which the defendant was charged with selling liquor to
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"Indians Not Taxed"
The phrase "Indians not taxed" was frequently used in state
constitutions and statutes to exclude Indians from voting, and
is found in the U.S. Constitution. 8 It has been utilized as an
economic argument that Indians should not be permitted to vote
or participate in revenue decisions, i.e., bond elections, because
they do not pay taxes.9 Additionally, some states have maintained that if the state government has no taxing power over an
Indian reservation, then Indians should not be able to participate
in the election of state officials.
The 1917 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Opsahl
v. Johnson'00 typifies these views. In Opsahl, the court denied
members of the Red Lake Chippewa Tribe the right to participate in county elections because the Indians had0 1 not "yielded
obedience and submission to [Minnesota] laws."'
The court reasoned that Minnesota Indians were not subject
to taxation as were other state residents. °2 Therefore, the court
concluded, it would be inconsistent with the state constitution
to allow Indians the right to elect representatives. 103 The court
stated:
It cannot for a moment be considered that the Framers
of the Constitution intended to grant the right of
suffrage to persons who were under no obligation to
obey the laws enacted as a result of such grant. Or,
in other words, that those who do not come within
the operations of the laws of the state, nevertheless
shall have power to make and impose laws upon

an Indian. The purchaser-Indian was declared to be under federal supervision even
though he had not lived among his Warm Springs Tribe for fifteen years. The federal

court found that "an Indian cannot make himself a citizen of the United States without
the consent and cooperation of the government." United States v. Osborn, 2 F. 58, 61

(D. Or. 1880).
98. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 2.

99. Today, Indians pay a variety of taxes-federal, state and tribal. Indians living
on certain Indian reservations also have tax exemptions not generally applicable to nonIndians.
100. 138 Minn. 42, 163 N.W. 988 (1917).
101. Id., 163 N.W. at 991.
102. Quoting the state, the court declared, "The tribal Indian contributes nothing
to the state. His property is not subject to taxation, or to the process of its courts. He

bears none of the burdens of civilization, and performs none of the duties of the
citizens." Id., 163 N.W. at 990.
1.03. Id.
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others. The idea is repugnant to our form of government. No one should participate in the making of laws
he need not obey. 0 4
In 1940, five states (Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico,
and Washington) still prohibited "Indians not taxed" from
voting, 10 5 even though they granted the franchise to whites who
were not taxed. These states simply did not want Indians to
participate in revenue decisions that they determined imposed
financial burdens on non-Indians only.
On January 26, 1938, the Department of the Interior issued
an opinion on the denial of the franchise to Indians. 10 6 The
solicitor concluded:
I am of the opinion that the Fifteenth Amendment
clearly prohibits any denial of the right to vote to
Indians under circumstances in which non-Indians
would be permitted to vote. The laws of Idaho, New
Mexico and Washington which would exclude Indians
not taxed from voting, in effect exclude citizens of
one race from voting on grounds which are not applied
to citizens of other races. For this reason, such laws
are unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.'°7
Eventually, four of the five states permitted Indians to vote
regardless of taxation. New Mexico, however, persisted in its
efforts to disenfranchise Indians based on the taxation issue.
In 1948, Miguel Trujillo, from Isleta Pueblo in New Mexico,
was prohibited from voting because he did not have to pay state
taxes on his property. Trujillo filed suit in federal court challenging the phrase "Indians not taxed" in the New Mexico
Constitution.'0 The district court found the prohibition in the
New Mexico Constitution constituted a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.2 9 Judge Phillips stated, for
the court:
Any other citizen, regardless of race, in the State of
New Mexico who has not paid one cent of tax of any
104. Id.
105. IDA.o CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1890, amended 1950); N.M. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1;
VASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (1890, amended 1968).
106. Op. Solic. Interior Dep't, M29,596 (Jan. 26, 1938).
107. Id.
108. Trujillo v. Carley, No. 1353 (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 1948) (three judge court).
109. Id., slip op. at 7.
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kind or character, if he possesses the other qualifications, may vote. An Indian, and only an Indian, in
order to meet the qualifications to vote, must have
paid a tax. How you can escape the conclusion that
makes a requirement with respect to an Indian as a
qualification to exercise the elective franchise and does
not make that requirement with respect to the member
of any race is beyond me. I just feel like the conclusion
is inescapable.110
The cry of "representation without taxation" echoed again in
the 1970s in New Mexico and Arizona."' The courts, however,
failed to validate the arguments of opponents to Indian voters.
In :1973, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an Indian may
be elected to a county position even though he was immune
from county and state taxation." 2 Similarly, the New Mexico
Supreme Court ruled that Indians may vote on a school board
issue even though they were not taxed for repayment of a
bond. "
Indians Under Guardianship
A third means employed by states to deny Indians the right
to vote was the claim that Indians were under guardianship and,
therefore, ineligible to participate in elections. For example,
according to the Arizona Constitution, "No person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane, shall be qualified
to
' 4
vote! at any election ... unless restored to civil rights. 1"
In 1928, two members of the Pima Tribe of the Gila River
Reservation attempted to register to vote in the first presidential
election held after the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 had granted
them citizenship. Robert Porter and Rudolph Johnson, the tribal
members denied registration, sought a writ of mandamus directing the county registrar to enter their names on the county
regi,;ter." 5
The Arizona Supreme Court considered two questions. First,
was the Gila River Reservation within the boundaries of Arizona? If so, Porter and Johnson would be considered residents
110. Id., slip op. at 7-8.
I1. Shirley v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 510, 513 P.2d 939 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); Prince v. Board of Educ., 88 N.M. 548, 543 P.2d 1176 (1975).
11.2. Shirley, 513 P.2d at 939-40.

113. Prince, 543 P.2d at 1176.
11-4. Amz. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2.
115. Porter v. Hall, 34 Ariz. 308, 271 P. 411, 412 (1928).
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of Arizona.11 6 Second, were Indians "under11guardianship"
within
7
the meaning of the Arizona Constitution?
The court determined that Indians residing on reservations
located within state boundaries were residents of Arizona."8 The
court, however, concluded that Mr. Porter and Mr. Johnson,
as wards of the federal government, were "under guardianship"
within the meaning of the Arizona Constitution and, thus, not
qualified to vote." 9
In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on the language of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia: "Their [tribes] relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."' 2 Numerous cases2 following Cherokee Nation are quoted with similar wording.' '
In addition, the court refused to follow the earlier North
Dakota case, Swift v. Leach, which rejected the "under guardianship" argument.'2 The court added that whew the "Indian
wards" are "released from their guardianship" by the United
States, the state will entitle them "to vote on the same terms
as other citizens."'
In a strongly-worded dissent, Chief Justice Ross pointed out
that Indians are citizens by virtue of the Indian Citizenship Act
of 1924.'24 More significantly, he argued that Chief Justice
Marshall, in Cherokee Nation, stated that the Indians' relation
to the United States resembled that of a ward to a guardian:
"It is not a guardianship.., but 'resembles' a guardianship."'125
The guardianship referred to in the Arizona Constitution is a
court-determined legal guardianship, Ross argued; therefore, it
has no application to Indians.' 26
The reasoning of Chief Justice Ross is correct. The federalIndian trust relationship created in Cherokee Nation is unique
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id., 271 P. at 413.
Id.
Id., 271 P. at 415.
Id. 271 P. at 418.
Id., 271 P. at 417 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16

(1882).
121. Id., 271 P. at 417-18. E.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)
("These Indians are wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United
States."); see also Jones v. Meechan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Williams v. Johnson, 239 U.S.
414 (1915).
122. Porter, 271 P. at 418-19 (citing Swift v. Leach, 45 N.D. 437, 178 N.W. 437,
(1920)).
123. Id., 271 P. at 419.

124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1882)).
126. Id.
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and differs greatly from common law guardianship. 27 The federal obligation toward Indians is expressed in treaties, statutes,
agreements, executive orders, and administrative regulations.
These obligations define the required standard of conduct for
federal officials and Congress. In matters not subject to federal
restrictions or responsibilities, Indians are as independent and
as competent as other persons. Moreover, common law guardianships are supervised by state courts and terminate if and
when the disability (mental incompetency, infancy) ends.
For twenty years, Porter v: Hall stood unchallenged. Upon
returning home from fighting during World War II, many Indian
veterans pushed for the right to vote.'2 In 1948, two MohaveApache Indians attempted to register to vote but were turned
away. They filed suit and the Arizona Supreme Court again had
the opportunity to interpret
the meaning of the clause "persons
12 9
under guardianship.
This time the Arizona Supreme Court took a different view.
The court distinguished between common law guardianship and
the guardianship described in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. Citing Chief Justice Ross' dissent in Porter, the court held the
guardianship clause in the Arizona Constitution was "intended
to mean a judicially established guardianship . . . [and] has no
application to the plaintiff[s] or to the federal status of Indians
in Arizona as a class."' 13 0 The court noted that Porter was a
"tortions [sic] construction by the [state] judicial branch of the
simple phrase 'under guardianship', to accomplish a purpose
never designed by the 2legislature."'' Thus, Porterwas expressly
overruled by Harris.1
Indians As Non-Residents
An equally tenuous fourth argument used to bar Indians from
voting was a residence clause in certain state election statutes.
127. For a further discussion, see Houghton, The Legal Status of Indian Suffrage
in the United States, 19 CAnP. L. Ray. 507, 508, 511-12 (1931).
128. Approximately 25,000 Indians served in the armed forces during World War
II. Peterson, supra note 74, at 123. In 1947, the President's Committee on Civil Rights

declaTed the state prohibitions, such as those in Porter, discriminatory and explained
that "[P]rotest against these legal bans on Indian suffrage in the Southwest have gained
force with the return of Indian veterans to those states." REor oF Tim PRESImENT's
CoMUssIoN ON Crv Ricimrs 40 (1947).
129.
130.
131.
132.

Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948).
Id., 196 P.2d at 463.
Id., 196 P.2d at 461.
Id., 196 P.2d at 463.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the New Mexico and Utah courts
wrestled with the issue about whether a person living on a
reservation located within a state was a resident of that state.
In a 1956 case, Allen v. Merrell,'33 the Supreme Court of
Utah interpreted the state's election statute, which provided:
"Any person living upon any Indian or military reservation shall
not be deemed a resident of Utah within the meaning of this
chapter, unless such person had acquired a residence in some
county in Utah prior to taking up his residence upon such Indian
or military reservation. ' 134 The court concluded that the statute
was not a denial of the right to vote on the basis of race in
violation of the equal protection clause.13 5 The court justified
the residence requirement on three grounds: (1) tribal sovereignty, (2) federal government control of the reservation, and
(3) Indians were not acquainted with the processes of government. 136 The court further reasoned that Indians do not speak
English, do not pay taxes, and are not fully under state jurisdiction, and therefore, the residency statute was justified. 37 The
Allen opinion also expressed a fear that the Indian population
might outnumber the white voters, and it would be unfair to
let them control state politics because they had "an extremely
limited interest in its functions and very little responsibility in
providing the financial support thereof."13
Allen was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
vacated the decision and remanded it for rehearing.139 In the
interim, the Utah legislature repealed the disenfranchisement
statute.,40
In 1962, the New Mexico Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the issue of residency involving Indians in Montoya v.
Bolack.'41 The Indians' right to vote was challenged in vain by
the unsuccessful candidate for Lieutenant Governor of New
Mexico, who would have been the victor had the Navajo votes
in San Juan and McKinley counties been thrown out.
Montoya contended that Indian reservations were not part of
the state and, therefore, not a "residence" for voting pur133. 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P.2d 490 (1956).
134.
135.
136.
137.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-2-14 (11) (1953).
Allen, 305 P.2d at 495.
Id., 305 P.2d at 492.
Id., 305 P.2d at 495.

138. Id.
139. 353 U.S. 932 (1957). For further discussion of Allen, see Note, Denial of Voting
Rights to Reservation Indians, 5 UTAH L. REv. 247 (1956).
140. Act of Feb. 14, 1957, ch. 38, 1957 Utah Laws 89-90.
141. 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962).
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poses. 142 Moreover, he argued problems could arise with polling
places located on reservations: If there was a violation of the
state election code, nothing could be done
because the state did
143
not have jurisdiction on the reservation.
In upholding the Indians' right to vote, the court recognized
that lack of state jurisdiction over Indians "is of serious moment, but so is the refusal of the right to vote."' 44
Tribal Sovereignty
During the nineteenth century, opponents of Indian citizenship
took the position that maintaining tribal ties was incompatible
with citizenship, being 'civilized', and voting in state elections. 14
This argument was discussed and disposed of in early cases.
However, in recent voting rights litigation, states and local
officials have resurrected the argument to abridge and diminish
the voting rights of Indians.
The argument used by states is that Indians do not care or
wish to participate in state or county affairs, and instead rely
on the tribal and federal government for certain services and
political participation. Therefore, states maintain, tribal sovereignty, rather than discrimination, explains the state government's treatment of Indians and also the diminished
participation
147
of Indians in state and local political activities.
The tribal sovereignty/reduced participation position has been
rejected by the federal government. When Congress extended
the protections of the Voting Rights Act of J975, l4 it considered
the tribal sovereignty argument. Congress found that discrimination against Indians and other language minorities by the
states "was substantial" and that "[1]anguage minority citizens,
like blacks throughout the South, must overcome the effects of
discrimination as well as efforts to minimize the impact of their
political participation. 149 Based upon an "extensive evidentiary
record" demonstrating the prevalence of voting discrimination
142. Id., 372 P.2d at 388.
143. Id., 372 P.2d at 394.
144. Id.

145. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
146. For example, see Swift v. Leech, 45 N.D. 437, 178 N.W. 439 (1920).

147. See Defendant's Brief on Remand, Buckanaga v. Sisseton School Indep. Dist.,
No. 84-1025 (1988); Defendants' Post-Trial Brief, Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn,
647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986) (No. CV83-225 BLG-ER).
148. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 402; S. REP. No. 295,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1975).
149. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 38 (1975).
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against Indians, 150 Congress extended the special pre-clearance
provisions of section 5 to include language minorities. It also
required a number of jurisdictions with Indian populations to
provide bilingual election procedures. 151 Congressional action in
extending the Voting Rights Act to Indians belies state arguments
that diminished political participation of Indians is unrelated to
discrimination.
Congress again disposed of the tribal sovereignty claim when
it amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1982.152 Section
2 expressly applies to Indians; Congress stated that it was adopting a nationwide standard for vote dilution. 5 3 Thus, state arguments that Indian vote dilution cases are unique or are
somehow an exception to the Voting Rights Act are unavailing.
In Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn,154 the Montana federal
district court rejected the tribal sovereignty/reduced participation
position. In Windy Boy, the court considered the issue of dual
status and whether it reduced Indian political participation. The
court stated:

*

The Court does not find that dual sovereignty explains
the inability of Indians to participate fully in the
political processes of Big Horn County. Indians, for
example, as concerned about schools as white citizens,
and a good number have run for school board over
the last twenty years. There is no evidence that interest
in tribal affairs has not in any lessened Indian parents'
involvement in their children's education. Racially polarized voting and the effects of past and present
discrimination explain the lack of Indian political influence in the country, far better than existence of
tribal government.1 55
The tribal sovereignty/reduced participation position has also
been equated to the arguments made by southerners to justify
black disenfranchisement and white supremacy-that is, that
black-white relations were special or unique, that blacks preferred segregation, that they wanted to be separate from whites,
that they did not want to register and vote, and that they
150. Id. at 24.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 1973b, 1973aa-la (1976); 28 C.F.R. .§ 55 app. (1984).
152. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 131-32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)

(1973)).
153. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 42 (1982).
154. 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986).

155. Id. at 1021.
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preferred their own way of doing things.5 Like many generations of southerners who defended segregation, the states seek
to blmne the victim for the crime.
Finally, the argument that Indians have less political energy
than whites to exert on state or county elections because their
time is spent exclusively on tribal matters is a variant of the
"apathy" argument which has been used to justify the exclusion
of blacks from political participation in the South-an argument
unifoirmly rejected by the courts.5 States would be hard-pressed
to demonstrate a case that Indians have less political energy
than whites. History shows Indians have, in fact, participated
and are willing to participate when given the opportunity. Indeed, studies of Indian voters in the states of Montana, South
Dakota, Washington, Arizona, and New Mexico demonstrate
that issues of concern to Indian
voters can impact the outcome
58
of state and local elections.
The Continuing Quest for Full PoliticalParticipation
The majority of blatant legislation and local actions which
prohibit Indians from voting have been repealed or struck down
by the courts. Registration of Indian voters has increased substantially, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of
156. This argument was presented by the plaintiffs in Windy Boy. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Post-Trial Brief at 9, Windy Boy (No. DV 83-225-BLO). See
also Derfner, RacialDiscriminationand the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. RE,. 523 (1973)
(discussion of the disenfranchisement of blacks after Reconstruction).
157. United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1568 (11th Cir.
1984); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1536 (1lth Cir. 1984);
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 134, 145 (5th Cir. 1977).
158. A recent political behavior study at the Tohono O'dham and Gila River
Reservations in Arizona concluded that a candidates' stand on Indian issues and concerns
for Indians were very important, receiving high percentages of 81% and 86% respectively.
NAT'L INDM.N YouTH CoUNcIL, PoLIcTAL AND ATTITUDES BEHAVIOR POLL AT TouoNo
OlODHm AND GILA RIVR, AImoNA (1986). Similarly, a poll conducted on the Navajo
Reservation showed that 69% of Navajos interviewed found a candidate's concern for
Indian issues and people the most important factor. NAT'L INDIAN YOUTH COUNCnL,
NAVAO IiDLx PO cAL ATTIrrTUDEs AND BEHAVIOR POLL 16 (1984).
Helen Peterson examined Indian voters in the 1952 and 1956 elections and found
Indians turning out to vote against specific policies affecting Indians. Peterson, supra
note 74, at 125. Stephen Kunitz's and Jerrold Levy's study of Navajo voting in the
1968 national election and Jack Holmes' review of Navajo voters in the 1967 New
Mexico election showed Navajos voting on issues of importance to them and supporting
specific aimdidates sponsoring such issues. Kunitz & Levy, Navajo Voting Patterns,
PLATEAU, Summer, 1970, at 1, 1-8; J. Hoass, PoLucs IN NEw MExico (1967). See
also D. MCCOOL, supra note 91, at 116-28.
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Indians voting. 5 9 Indians are seeking election to local school
boards and state government positions. Grassroots coalitions
and groups formed in Indian communities are registering Indian
voters door-to-door, sponsoring candidate forums, and providing voter information on significant issues. The result is a greater
awareness among Indians of their voting rights and the significant influence they can have on local, state and county elections.
In 1986, a National Indian Youth Council report showed there
were 852 Indians holding a nontribal elected office. Of the
officeholders, more than 90% were serving on school boards,
49 were serving in state-level positions, and one served in Congress.'60
A consequence of this upsurge in Indian political action and
success in the election of Indian candidates is a marked increase
in voting rights litigation. Indians are challenging state-devised
election schemes and systems that submerge Indian voting strength
or deny equal and effective participation in the political process.
The primary tool utilized by Indian voters to assert and protect
their fundamental constitutional rights is the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.161
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the culmination of efforts
to create an effective remedy for the systematic discriminatory
voting practices against minority communities. The Act is aimed
at precluding state government officials from interfering with
the right of minorities to register and vote. It is a complex
compilation of general provisions that are permanent and affect
all states and specific provisions that are temporary and only
affect2 jurisdictions that meet particular criteria stipulated in the
Act. 16
The most important provisions of the Act are section 2, which
bans voting practices that result in the denial or abridgment of
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in
159. See Windy Boy, 647 F. Supp. at 1004, 1007; D. McCooL, supra note 91, at
119-20. Despite this undeniable progress, registration and turnout of Indian voters can
still be characterized as low, as with other minority voters.
160. NAT'L INDIAN YOUTH CoUNcrM, INmAN ELECTED OrIcLAIus DmEcToRY (Nov.

1986). The sole congressman is Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a Northern Cheyenne residing
in Colorado.
161. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,

1973-1973bb-1 (1982)).
162. Provisions of the Voting Rights Act are described in U.S. COMM'N ON CrvL
Rass, THE VoTIo RxoHfs ACT: UNrrnrsan
PLLED GoALs].

GoALs 4-21 (1981) [hereinafter UNFUL-
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a lamguage minority,163 and sections 4 and 201, which abolish
"tests and devices" for voting.'" In 1970, Congress extended
the ban for five years and made it applicable nationwide. 16 Five
years later, Congress made the ban permanent.'" In 1982, Congress amended section 2 by adopting the results standard, primarily in response to City of Mobile v. Bolden.167
Other permanent provisions of the Act make it a crime to
deprive or intend to deprive anyone of the rights protected by
the Act,'8 abolish durational residency requirements, and establish uniform standards for absentee voting during presidential
elec.tions . 69 Additionally, the Act provides that any voter who
needs assistance because of a disability or an inability to read
or write is entitled to assistance. 170
163. In 1982, Congress strengthened the protection of the Act by amending § 2. See
Voting Rights Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 131-32 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1973)). Amended § 2 provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race, color or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973 (f)(2) of this
title as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976). Congress did not outright ban the use of the poll
tax as a condition for registration but did determine that the tax "denied or abridged"
the right to vote: Congress authorized the United States Attorney General to bring suit
in any jurisdiction where the tax was used to enjoin its enforcement. Id. § 1973h.
165. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314.
The Act had previously applied to specific jurisdictions.
166. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402.
167. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). In 1980, a sharply divided Court established a subjective
intent standard for vote dilution claims under the Constitution and § 2 of the Act. The
pluradity held that proof of racial purpose was a prerequisite for a violation of voting
rights. Id. at 72-74. For a discussion of the standard in vote dilution cases applied by
the courts pre-Bolden, see Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. Rav. 715 (1983).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1973j (1976).
169. Id. § 1973aa-I.
170. Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 5, 96 Stat.
131, 134-35 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-6 (1983)). Another provision of the Act
allows the Attorney General to send federal examiners to covered jurisdictions when the
Attorney General has received twenty or more written complaints alleging voter discrimination in that jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1933d, 1933f (1976).
Under §§ 3(a) and 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, a federal court can order a jurisdiction
to pre-clear [obtain approval] of its upcoming election. The federal court can then
adthorize the appointment of federal examiners if the Attorney General or an aggrieved
person files suit to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (1976). Under § 5 of the Act, certain jurisdictions
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Bilingual Elections
A special provision of the Act requiring assistance to language

minorities (American Indians, Asian-Americans, Alaska Natives
and Hispanics) was added in 1975.171 This provision was recently
extended until 1992.172 In 1975, Congress determined that "voting discrimination against citizens of language minorities is per-

vasive and national in scope." 173 It further concluded that, based

on testimony, language minorities had "been denied equal ed-

ucational opportunities by state and local governments" causing
them to have "severe disability and continuing illiteracy" in

English. 174 Language barriers combined with English-only registration and voting procedures excluded language minorities
from effective political participation. These were excellent reasons for congressional passage of the special minority language

provisions.

are encompassed by the Act and, therefore, are required to submit proposed changes
in its voting laws, practices, or procedures to either the U.S. Attorney General or the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
Federal examiners have been appointed in two jurisdictions affecting Indians in
situations not covered under the section. In United States v. Thurston County, Nebraska,
No. 78-0-380 (D. Neb. May 9, 1979) (consent decree), pre-clearance was stipulated in a
consent decree between the County and the Attorney General. The Attorney General
challenged the County's at-large method of electing its board of supervisors. It argued
that this method diluted the voting rights of members of the Omaha and Winnebago
Tribes, in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The consent decree required county
commissioners to be elected from single member districts. In addition, Thurston County
was placed under § 3(a), federal examiners were appointed, and the jurisdiction was
required to pre-clear its election changes for 5 years. Id. at 3.
The second case, United States v. Town of Bartelme, No. 78-C-101 (E.D. Wis. Feb.
17, 1978), involved Indian residents of the Stockbridge-Munsee Reservation in Wisconsin.
The United States alleged the Bartelme and Shawano County, Wisconsin, denied residents
of the Stockbridge-Munsee Reservation the right to vote. Town residents had signed a
petition that would sever the Reservation from the town. The petition was approved by
the County. Thus, residents of the Reservation were no longer allowed to vote in city
or county elections. However, a preliminary injunction was issued ordering the town to
allow residents of the Stockbridge-Munsee Reservation to vote.
171. Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 207, 89 Stat.
401, 402 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 1(c)(3) (1982)) (amending § 14(c)(3) of the Act).
172. See Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 4, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1973aa-la (1982)).
173. Voting Rights Act, 1975 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. at
401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (1982)) (amending § 4(f)(1) of the Act).
174. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing on S.407, S.903,
S. 1297, S.1409 and S. 1443, Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 214-19, 255-68, 738-56, 756-89 (1975).
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Specific jurisdictions under this section are required to provide
bilBagual forms and notices, bilingual ballots; bilingual voter
information, and oral assistance at the polls. 1 75 The provisions
also provide that when the language of the minority is oral or
unwritten, as many Indian languages are, the specific
jurisdiction' 76 is "only required to furnish oral instructions,
assistance, or other information relating to registration and
voting."lTwo Navajo cases, Apache County High School Dist. No. 90
v. United States 78 and United States v. County of San Juan,
New Mexico,179 are illustrative of the types of problems that
arise with the bilingual requirements. 8 0 In 1975, the Apache
County High School District in Arizona brought a declaratory
judgment in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in order to pre-clear its bilingual plan for a bond
election. In Apache County High School Dist. No. 90 v. United
States, the district court denied the school district's request and
found it had "deliberately failed to inform the Navajos" about
the election issues and the issues, because it had not disseminated
information in the Navajo language and it had not sent information to Navajo chapter officials.'' Further, the court found
the school district had not provided bilingual Navajo poll workers and it had limited the number of polls on the Navajo
Reservation.
I
A second, similar suit was brought five years later. In United
States v. County of San Juan, New Mexico, the United States
alleged that San Juan County failed to provide "oral instructions, assistance, and other information relating to the registration and voting process in the Navajo language whenever such
language was provided in English"; 8 failed to provide an adequate number of bilingual Navajo interpreters;' 84 and failed to
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(b)(f)(3), 1973aa-la(b), (c) (1982); 28 C.F.R. § 55.19 (1980).
176. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 appendix (1988) for jurisdictions covered under § 5 and

the minority language provisions.
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(f)(4), 1973aa-la(c) (1976).
178. No. 77-1815 (D.D.C. June 12, 1980).
179. No. 79-508JB (D.N.M. April 8, 1980).

180. These two cases are discussed extensively by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights in UNFLF-LLED GoAts, supra note 169, at 87-88.

181. Apache County High School, No. 77-1815, slip. op. at 4.
182. Id. at 5-6.
183. Complaint at 4, United States v. County of San Juan, New Mexico (No. 79508JB).
184. Id.
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provide sufficient information (in 18the
Navajo language) con5
cerning locations of polling places.
The parties entered into a settlement in which San Juan
County agreed to comply with the minority language provisions
in preparing and conducting elections.1:6 In addition, the County
agreed to (1) train poll workers in aspects of voter registration
and in giving assistance to bilingual voters; (2) establish more
poll places on the Navajo Reservation; (3) publish voting information in Navajo and English; and (4) undertake a voter registration of Navajos. '17
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act.'88 The
amendments to section 2 received the great debate because the
requirement of proving a discriminatory purpose for a section
2 violation was eliminated. 89 Amended section 2 provides that
any voting law or practice. which "results" in discrimination on
account
ful.1 ° of race or color, or language minority status, is unlawIn Bolden, the Supreme Court stated that proof of a discriminatory purpose was required to establish a statutory violation
of section 2.191 Congress responded directly to Bolden by amending the Voting Rights Act. The report of the House Committee
on the Judiciary explained the purpose of the amendment was
"to make clear that proof of discriminatory purpose or intent
is not required in cases brought under that provision" and "to
restate Congress' earlier intent that violations of the Voting
Rights Act, including section 2, could be established by showing
the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice,"' 19 and the
dilution or diminishment of the voting strength of minority
voters. Both the House and Senate reports give detailed guide185. Id.

186. Id. For minority language provisions, see 25 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1982).
187. United States v. County of San Juan County, Utah, No. 79-508JB, stipulation
at 4.
188. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1975e (1982)).
189. Id.at 134. See Parker, The Results Test of Section 2 of The Voting Rights
Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. Rsv. 715 (1983) (discussion of the
amendments to § 2).
190. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 131-32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)
(1982)).
191. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-74 (plurality opinion).
192. H.R. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981).
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lines on the implementation of section 2 and congressional intent
in amending the Act.193
'Vote dilution is "a process whereby election laws or practices,
either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting
among an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength of
at least one other group.' 9 4 Vote dilution takes many forms,
including reapportionment plans that fragment or concentrate
populations, 95 staggered terms, 19 majority vote requirements, 19
amlexations, 98 and numbered posts.99 The predominant form
of vote dilution today is at-large voting or multi-member districting.
Under an at-large scheme, residents of a school district or
county vote for the membership of the school board or county
commission. The majority, if it votes as a bloc, can choose all
the board members or officials, thus denying the minority an
effective opportunity to elect representatives of its choice. These
election systems can and do negate the gains made by minority
voters under the Voting Rights Act.
The amendment to section 2 and the subsequent Supreme
Court decisionsm have greatly supported Indian vote dilution
claims. Most of the litigation has been initiated or supported
by the Native American Rights Fund, National Indian Youth
Council, the Legal Services Corporation, and the American Civil
Liberties Union.
193. S.REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 28-9 (1982). These factors are taken
from the pre-Bolden voting cases of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer
v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
194. C. DAvwsON, MNoarry VOTE DnmunoN 4 (1984). The basic voting dilution
principles derive from the one person-one vote reapportionment case of Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). There, the Supreme Court stated:
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper
and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The
right to vote includes the right to have the ballot counted.... It also
includes the right to have the vote counted at full value without dilution

or discount ... that federally protected right suffers substantial dilution
...[where a] favored group has full voting strength. . .[and] [t]he groups
not in favor have their voters discounted.
Id. at 555 n.29 (quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
195. See Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986).
196. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
197. See City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982).
198. See id. at 166-67.
199. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982).
200. See id.; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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In 1986, in Windy Boy, the federal district court in Montana
alleged the Big Horn County and School District's at-large
election schemes were violative of section 2. Windy Boy came
about as a years of unsuccessful attempts by Crow and Northern
Cheyenne individuals to elect an Indian to the county commission and to the school board. The Indian plaintiffs presented
extensive evidence of past and continuing discrimination or polarization in voting, public accommodations, employment, appointments to boards and commissions, police protection, political
associations, housing, social and business organizations, and
churches. Historians, political scientists, and statisticians, serving
as expert witnesses on befialf of the plaintiffs, recounted the
record of discrimination in Big Horn County. 2° ' The court decided overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the
county and school district be redistricted into single-member
districts. 2
The use of single-member districts is an effective remedy to
voter dilution in at-large voting schemes. Single-member districts
have been utilized in several claims against at-large voting in
New Mexico, 203 Arizona,2 and Colorado. 20s
Where the minority population is geographically dispersed,
single-member districts do not always provide an equal opportunity for minorities to elect representatives of their choice.2
Limited and cumulative voting schemes are alternatives. In a
cumulative system, a voter casts a multiple vote for less than a
201. Windy Boy, 647
utilized several standards
on the factors developed
202. Windy Boy, 647

F. Supp. at 1006. In racial vote dilution cases,
to demonstrate vote dilution. In Windy Boy,
in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
F. Supp. at 1023. A single member district is

the courts have
the court relied
Cir. 1973).
where members

of the minority group constitute a majority.
203. Tso v. Cuba Indep. School Dist., No. 85-1023-JB (May 18, 1987) (consent
decree); Largo v. McKinley Consol. School Dist., No. 84-1751 HB (Nov. 26, 1984);

Estevan v. Grants-Cibola County School Dist., No. 84-1752 HB (Nov. 26, 1984). In
March 1985, the New Mexico legislature ended at-large voting schemes for all county
commissions, except in counties with populations less than 2,000, and for all school
boards, except districts with fewer than 500 students. See also Casuse v. City of Gallup,
No. 88-1007-HB (D.N.M. 1988). Bowannie v. Bernalillo School Dist., No. CN88-0212
(D.N.M. 1988).
204. Clark v. Holbrook Pub. School Dist., No. 3, No. 88-0148 PCTRGS (D. Ariz.
1988).
205. Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez, Colo. School Dist. No. RE-i, No. 89-C-964 (D.

Colo. 1990) (consent decree).
206. See Criteriafor Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. Ray.
77, 160 (1985); Note, Alternative Voting Systems As Remedies for Unlawful At-Large
Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144 (1982); Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in
MiNoarry VoTE DtrrioN, supra note 194, at 249-67.
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full slate of candidates (i.e., a voter casts more than one vote). 217
A voter does not have to belong to a plurality or a majority of
the electorate in order to elect a candidate of his choice. Cumulative voting has recently been used during settlements of
minority vote dilution cases in Alamagordo, New Mexico; Peoria, Illinois; and several towns in Alabama.
The cumulative voting system has been adopted in a recent
South Dakota case. In Buckanaga v. Sisseton School District,20 8
members of the Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Tribe challenged the
at-large voting system. In 1980, the Sisseton School District
contained 5,628 residents, of which 33.9% were Indian.2?9 The
school district was governed by a nine member board; three of
210
the nine members were elected every year to three year terms.
Tribal members had consistently been candidates21 for seats on
the school board, but had rarely been successful. '
On remand, the parties entered into a consent decree, agreeing
to the use of cumulative voting rules in future elections. 212 Voters
acquired the option of casting their three votes in any combination they wished. This allowed the school district to retain its
at-large, staggered-term system, yet provided the tribal members
with a more realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice.
The first interim election under the new voting rules was held
in Jume, 1989, and resulted in an Indian winning over a field
of seven candidates. In the May, 1990, election, a full ninemember board was elected by the 21school
district voters. Three
3
Indians were elected to the board.
Other discriminatory election laws and practices have fallen
when challenged by Indian voters. 214 In a South Dakota case, a
few days prior to the November, 1984, general election, a county
auditor rejected registration cards from an Indian registration
207. See Note, supra note 213, at 148-49, 153-54.
208. No. 84-1025 (D.S.D. 1985) (1985 WL 6683), rev'd and remanded, 804 F.2d 469

(8th Cfr. 1986).
209. Id., 804 F.2d at at 470.
210. Id.
211. Id., 804 F.2d at 476. The record showed that "from 1974 to the present [1986],
there has been only one Indian board member; and since 1982, 23 Indians sought office
and only 3 were successful." Id.
212. Consent Decree, Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. School Dist., No. 84-1025 (1988).
213. Report from Harvey DuMarce to the Native American Rights Fund (May,
1990) (unpublished report).
214. See, e.g., Love v. Lumberton City Bd. of Educ., No. 87-105-CIV-3 (D.N.C.
1987) (Lumbee Indians successfully challenged multi-member districting in North Carolina).
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drive. 2 5 One day before the general election, the district court
216
ordered the county officials to permit the Indians to vote.
In addition, Indians conducting registration drives have been
impeded by county officials. For example, a county auditor
limited the number of application forms to be given to Indian
voter registrars to ten-to-fifteen apiece. The registrars had traveled approximately eighty miles round-trip to begin their registration drive. In Fiddler v. Sisker,2 7 the court held the county
auditor had discriminated against Indian voters in violation of
section 2. The218court extended the deadline for voter registration
by one week.
In addition to the situations of Fiddler and American Horse,
Indian voters have challenged the denial of polling places in
outlying Indian communities. In Black Bull v. Dupree School
District No. 64-2,219 the Dupree School District was ordered to

establish four polling places on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. Prior to the lawsuit, Indian voters were forced to
travel up to 150 miles round-trip to vote in school board elections.m
Indian voters have also been involved in reapportionment
lawsuits. In Sanchez v. King,'21 New Mexico's reapportionment
plan was found to be violative of the one-person one-vote
principle. In Sanchez, the defendants were ordered to redraw
districts in compliance with the principle of population equality.
After the state legislature redrew the districts, Indian and Hispanic voters, in a second phase of the case, attacked the districting scheme on the grounds that the scheme resulted in an
impermissible dilution of minority voting strength violative of
section 2. A court-imposed redistricting plan was ordered into
effect to bring the state into compliance.mn
In summary, the above cases have demonstrated that as recently as eight years ago, Indian voters were covertly discrimi215. American Horse v. Kundert, No. 84-5159 (D.S.D. Nov. 5, 1984).
216. Id., slip op. at 1 (Order).

217. No. 85-3050 (D.S.D. Oct. 24, 1986). Similar evidence of discrimination was
presented in Windy Boy. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
218. Fiddler, No. 85-3050.
219. No. 86-3012 (D.S.D. May 14, 1986) (Stipulation for Settlement).

220. Prior to the stipulation, a temporary restraining order was ordered to halt the
school board election.
221. 550 F. Supp. 13 (D.N.M. 1982), aff'd 459 U.S. 801 (1983). See also Ratdiff

v. Municipality of Anchorage, No. A86-036 (D. Alaska 1989) (challenge to reapportionment plan of city by Alaskan Natives).
222. Sanchez v. King, No. 82-0067-M (Aug. 8, 1984).
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nated against, and were required to seek adjudication of a right
long recognized as a personal right.
Conclusion
1uis article has discussed the resistance by states and local
entities to Indian participation in virtually every aspect of the
electoral process. While early federal policies encouraged Indians
to adopt the ways and practices of the majority society, Indians
were prohibited from exercising their freedom of choice of
representatives. The courts have played a major role in construing the numerous, and sometimes conflicting, federal statutes
and regulations that seek to protect Indian voting rights, and
will continue to do so in the future.
With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Indians
have intensified the fight for increased political participation and
have made great strides in defeating the various discriminatory
state voting schemes. Indians will continue to face the enduring
legacy of racial discrimination as the campaign for equal voting
rights spreads throughout Indian Country. Indians now know
they can significantly influence the local political decision-making policies that affect their lives. Thus, Indians will continue
to seek the goal of political equality envisioned in the fifteenth
amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

